A Cross Of Gold - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.com

A Cross Of Gold - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.com
I’d add another point: the 19th-century economy had much more flexible prices and wages than later came to be the case — not, primarily, because of different institutions, but because it was still largely an economy of small, self-employed farmers. More than half of US workers were in agriculture up until the 1880s. Peter Temin has told me — I can’t find it in a quick search — that the United States didn’t start having modern recessions, with large declines in real GDP, until the Panic of 1873; Britain started having them much earlier, because it became an industrial economy earlier.

High Income Disparity Leads to Low Savings Rates « naked capitalism

Citigroup Plutonomy reports in 2005 and 2006 by Ajay Kapur, Niall Macleod, and Narendra Singh as reported by Yves Smith:

In a plutonomy, the rich drop their savings rate, consume a larger fraction of their bloated, very large share of the economy. This behavior overshadows the decisions of everybody else. The behavior of the exceptionally rich drives the national numbers – the “appallingly low” overall savings rates, the “over-extended consumer”, and the “unsustainable” current accounts that
accompany this phenomenon….

Feeling wealthier, the rich decide to consume a part of their capital gains right away. In other words, they save less from their income, the wellknown
wealth effect. The key point though is that this new lower savings rate is applied
to their newer massive income. Remember they got a much bigger chunk of the
economy, that’s how it became a plutonomy. The consequent decline in absolute savings for them (and the country) is huge when this happens. They just account for too large a part of the national economy; even a small fall in their savings rate overwhelms the decisions of all the rest.

Yves here. This account rather cheerily dismisses the notion that there might be overextended consumers on the other end of the food chain. Unprecedented credit card delinquencies and mortgage defaults suggest otherwise. But behaviors on both ends of the income spectrum no doubt played into the low-savings dynamic: wealthy who spend heavily, and struggling average consumers who increasingly came to rely on borrowings to improve or merely maintain their lifestyle. And let us not forget: were encouraged to monetize their home equity, so they actually aped the behavior of their betters, treating appreciated assets as savings. Before you chide people who did that as profligate (naive might be a better characterization), recall that no one less than Ben Bernanke was untroubled by rising consumer debt levels because they also showed rising asset levels. Bernanke ignored the fact that debt needs to be serviced out of incomes, and households for the most part were not borrowing to acquire income-producing assets. So unless the rising tide of consumer debt was matched by rising incomes, this process was bound to come to an ugly end.

The US shows a negative relationship between income concentration and savings (data points 1929-2002, with 1940-1944 excluded, which is defensible, given widespread wartime rationing):

Canada shows the same downward sloping relationship, as does the UK (although the authors have to massage the data a bit more, with one downward sloping line for the period before 1990, with a shift for the 1990s period).

Debt Is A Political Issue - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.com

Debt Is A Political Issue - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.com: "one audience member asked a really good question: if the problem is that interest rates are at the zero lower bound, why should we worry about government borrowing? After all, doesn’t that mean that the government can borrow at a zero rate?

Now, part of the answer is that you really don’t want governments financing themselves largely with very short-term debt — that makes them too vulnerable to liquidity crises. But even long-term rates are low — the real interest rate on 10-year bonds is below 1.5 percent.

And if you do the arithmetic of debt service, that really does seem to suggest that debt isn’t a problem. To stabilize the real value of debt, all the government has to do is pay the real interest on it. So suppose that we add debt equal to 100 percent of GDP, which is much more than currently projected; servicing that debt should cost only 1.4 percent of GDP, or 7 percent of federal spending. Why should that be intolerable?

And even that, you could argue, is too pessimistic. To stabilize the debt/GDP ratio, all you need is to pay r-g, where r is the real interest rate and g the economy’s real growth rate; and right now r-g looks, ahem, negative.

And this benign view of debt isn’t just hypothetical: countries have, in reality, run up immense debt/GDP ratios without going insolvent: see the history of Britain, above.

So what’s the problem? Confidence. If bond investors start to lose confidence in a country’s eventual willingness to run even the small primary surpluses needed to service a large debt, they’ll demand higher rates, which requires much larger primary surpluses, and you can go into a death spiral.

So what determines confidence? The actual level of debt has some influence — but it’s not as if there’s a red line, where you cross 90 or 100 percent of GDP and kablooie; see the chart above. Instead, it has a lot to do with the perceived responsibility of the political elite."

Grasping Reality with All Six Feet

Grasping Reality with All Six Feet: "It is important to note that effective expansionary fiscal policy requires two things:

*Lots of people need to be involuntarily unemployed--to have a productivity of zero--so that when the government hires people to do things, a substantial chunk of the people it hires do have their productivity go up by a lot. Otherwise--if there aren't a lot of involuntarily unemployed people--you are going to boost the flow of nominal spending but not production (or employment).
*The bonds that the government sells to finance its hiring program need to have only a small effect on interest rates--if they have a large effect on interest rates, then private businesses that were hiring people to expand their productive capacity will lay them off, their productivity will drop to zero, and we won't have gotten anywhere."

Economist's View: "The Invincible Markets Hypothesis"

Economist's View: "The Invincible Markets Hypothesis": "There are two versions of the efficient markets hypothesis, a strong version and a weak version. According to the strong version prices accurately reflect the underlying intrinsic value of financial assets, but the weak version only requires that prices be unpredictable, they don't have to accurately reflect fundamental values.

The strong version is, well, too strong and it seems clear that this condition is not satisfied in asset markets, at least not on a continuous basis. The weak version, however, does have support (though even here there is not universal agreement). The distinction between the strong and weak versions, and the assertion that the weak version holds even if the strong version does not, is often used as a defense of the efficient markets hypothesis.

Rajiv Sethi asks a good question. If the strong version of the efficient markets hypothesis does not hold, in what sense does satisfying the weaker form constitute 'efficiency'? He argues that 'it makes little sense to say that markets are efficient, even if they are essentially unpredictable in the short run. In light of this, he proposes a new name for the weak form of the hypothesis:"

Macroeconomic effects of Chinese mercantilism - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.com

Macroeconomic effects of Chinese mercantilism - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.com: "For something I’m working on: we know that China is pursuing a mercantilist policy: keeping the renminbi weak through a combination of capital controls and intervention, leading to trade surpluses and capital exports in a country that might well be a natural capital importer. We also know, or should know, that this amounts to a beggar-thy-neighbor policy — or, more accurately, a beggar-everyone but yourself policy — when the world’s major economies are in a liquidity trap.

But how big is the impact? Here’s a quick back-of-the-envelope assessment.

Start with the Chinese surplus. It has been temporarily depressed by the world trade collapse, but seems to be on the rise again. Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, at the IMF but speaking for themselves, project a Chinese current account surplus for 2010-2014 of 0.9 percent of gross world product.

You can think of this as a negative shock to rest-of-world net exports. (Technically, that’s not quite correct — because the shock depresses res-of-world GDP and hence rest-of-world imports from China, the realized trade surplus is smaller than the shock. But that’s a small correction.)

In turn, this negative shock is like a negative shock to government purchases of goods and services. So it should have a similar multiplier. Multiplier estimates are all over the place, but tend to cluster around 1.5. So we’re looking at a negative impact on gross world product of around 1.4 percent. Not huge — China isn’t the principal obstacle to recovery — but significant.

And, if we think of the United States as bearing a proportionate share, and also use the rule of thumb that one point of GDP = 1 million jobs, we’re looking at 1.4 million U.S. jobs lost due to Chinese mercantilism."

What Happened to the Phillips Curve?

What Happened to the Phillips Curve?: "truth be told, the Phillips Curve has not worked well outside
America. Economists Doug Staiger, Mark Watson, and Jim Stock pointed out in the _Journal of Economic Perspectives_ that even in the United States the Phillips Curve relationship was never as strong or as good at forecasting inflation as was taught in intermediate macroeconomics. And only in the United States has there been a relatively stable natural rate of unemployment to serve as a reliable indicator of when demand pressure is about to raise inflation. Elsewhere the causes of rising inflation have
always been too complex to be summarized by simply comparing unemployment to even a semi-stable 'natural rate.'

Thus perhaps the surprising thing is not that Phillips Curve-based
forecasts of inflation have gone awry in the past half decade. Perhaps the surprising thing is that the complicated economic processes determining changes in inflation could be summarized for so long by such a simple relationship as the standard Phillips Curve. In any event one thing is very clear: the simple theory of the relation between inflation and unemployment that economists have peddled for a quarter century no longer works; if economists are to be of any use, they need to come up with a better - and in all likelihood more sophisticated - approach to understanding why inflation rises."